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Abstract 
 
This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the 
market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily 
Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy 
was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the 
policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. 
Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect 
of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper 
highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) 
collusion. 
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1 Introduction 
Understanding the interdependence of pricing strategies in oligopolies is a fundamental issue. 
Firms with market power might use a specific pricing behavior to influence competitors’ actions 
in order to facilitate price coordination and sustain (tacit) collusion. 1    
In this paper we provide empirical evidence of the role of unilateral price commitment to sustain 
(tacit) collusion and highlight the role of price-stickiness as an endogenous commitment device to 
collude. Infrequent and large price changes by the market leader may facilitate tacit coordination 
on the leader’s focal price and result in higher prices. On 6th October 2004, ENI, the market 
leader on the Italian petrol market, publicly announced a new pricing policy which consisted of 
infrequent price variations (sticky pricing) and price changes larger in magnitude. ENI increased 
the time lag between price changes from 6 to 16 days and increased the mean price change from 
1% to 5.8%. About five months later the Italian Truckers’ Association complained to the Italian 
antitrust authority about collusion by the Italian petrol firms. Allegedly, firms maintained high 
and aligned prices which they changed simultaneously.2 Because the antitrust authority had no 
evidence of firms’ explicit communication, it ended its investigation without issuing a formal 
decision after the firms accepted to restrict pricing transparency.3  
In the empirical analysis we document that the leader’s unilateral sticky price commitment with 
larger price changes had two major effects: first, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on 
the leader’s focal price with the observed pricing pattern shifting from cost-based to sticky-
leadership pricing. Second, prices increased relatively to a control group. To our knowledge this 
is the first paper that empirically shows the role of endogenous price commitment by the market 
leader who acted both as the initiator of the new collusive pricing and as the coordinator of price 
changes.     
Our research is related to two strands of literature: cartel detection and dynamic pricing. 
Economists have long used their knowledge of collusive behavior to derive testable hypotheses 
to distinguish between collusion and competition.4 Porter and Zona (1999) use data from the 
                                                 
1 While firms might also (illegally) communicate to collude, the benefits of communication might be smaller for oligopolies. In a 
meta-study of detected cartels Levenstein and Suslow (2006) show that there is no clear relation between the likelihood of 
collusion and concentration. Using a laboratory experiment Fonseca and Norman (2012) find that concentrated industries are able 
to collude irrespectively of communication. Thus, understanding the role of specific pricing strategies used to tacitly collude is of 
key importance for competition policy and regulators as evidence of collusion is mostly based on evidence of communication. 
2 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, 
Section I para. 1; available at http://www.agcm.it. 
3 The inability of antitrust authorities to deal with tacit collusion poses the question on whether and how antitrust policy should 
respond to tacit collusion in oligopolies, an issue we discuss in Andreoli-Versbach and Franck (2013). For the final report by the 
Italian antitrust authority on this case see: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 20.12.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei 
carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 17754; available at http://www.agcm.it. 
4 See Harrington (2008) for a review of empirical cartel detection and Zitzewitz (2012) for a general review of forensic economics. 
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Ohio school milk auction and find that bids by colluding firms decreased the further the distance 
from the schools which is inconsistent with a competitive model. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) 
analyze structural breaks in the pricing of firms supplying seafood in a bid-rigging conspiracy. 
They find that the price mean (variance) significantly decreased by 16% (increased by 200%) after 
the collapse of the cartel. While these studies use data on detected cartels, other papers build test 
hypotheses to uncover cases of collusion. Knittel and Stango (2003) use data from the credit card 
market during the 1980s and find that a non-binding price ceiling may serve as a focal point to 
facilitate tacit collusion. Duso et al. (2012) test whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to 
downstream collusion and find that large horizontal networks are most likely to collude. Finally, 
Christie and Schultz (1994) have documented “suspicious” bid-ask quotes by market makers in 
the Nasdaq who increased their margins by avoiding the use of “odd-eights”.5  
The second strand of literature related to our study examines dynamic pricing strategies in 
gasoline markets. A large part of this literature has focused on asymmetric price-cost adjustment 
(Borenstein et al., 1997, Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003, Tappata, 2009). Most papers find that 
prices respond faster to cost increases than to cost decreases, a phenomenon referred to as 
“rockets and feathers”. This asymmetry has been related to inventories, collusion, and 
consumers’ searching costs. More related to this article is a series of empirical papers aiming at 
characterizing the properties of Maskin and Tirole (1988) Edgeworth cycles observed in gasoline 
markets in the U.S. (Lewis, 2012, Eckert, 2003), Canada (Noel, 2007) and Australia (Wang, 2009). 
Noel (2007) analyzes dynamic pricing in 19 Canadian cities over 574 weeks. Using a Markow-
switching regression he estimates both the prevalence and structural characteristics of the three 
pricing patterns he finds: cost-based pricing, sticky-pricing and price cycles. He finds that cycles 
(sticky-pricing) are more prevalent when there are many (few) small firms. Wang (2009) studies 
the Australian gasoline market in relation to a unique policy change which required firms to 
change their prices simultaneously and only once per day. This policy increased the “commitment 
costs” by firms to be the first to “relent” after prices fell in a cycle. Whereas before the law a 
single large firm appeared to be the price leader and was consistently the first to raise prices, after 
the policy change firms adopted mixed strategies and took turns at being the first to raise prices. 
Lewis (2012) studies the role of price leadership in coordinating price increases in cycling gasoline 
markets in the U.S. and finds that the first price increases tend to stem from retail chains that 
operate a large number of stations. 
                                                 
5 They found relevant evidence of collusion between brokerage firms making markets in Nasdaq stocks by looking at the bid-ask 
spread, the traders’ margin. As soon as their results became public, this pricing behaviour ended and the subsequent investigation 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission led to settlements of over $1 billion.   
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Our paper complements the literature in three important ways. First, we document the role of 
endogenous price commitment in switching from cost-based to sticky-focal pricing equilibrium. 
Second, while Wang (2009) and Lewis (2012) highlight the importance of leadership pricing in 
the relenting phase of Edgeworth cycles we show its importance in coordinating price changes in 
response to cost shocks during sticky-pricing. Finally, our setting with a clear shift in the 
industry’s pricing behaviour allows us to develop an identification strategy that quantifies the 
causal effect of sticky-focal pricing on the price level. This enables us to draw some conclusions 
on the pro-collusive effects of sticky-focal pricing as compared to cost-based pricing.      
The key difficulty in analyzing dynamic pricing strategies is the non-experimental nature of the 
data. Neither the new pricing policy by the market leader, ENI, nor the leader’s (large) price 
changes which were matched by those of its competitors can be regarded as exogenous. In 
addition demand and firm-level cost shocks are unobservable. Using existing theoretical and 
empirical models on price leadership (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990, and Mouraviev and Rey, 
2011) and price stickiness (Athey and Bagwell, 2001, 2008, Athey et al., 2004, Abrantes-Metz et 
al., 2006, Blanckenburg et al., 2012, and Connor, 2005) we first characterize and then evaluate the 
effects of the different pricing patterns. First, we use daily firm-level wholesale prices in Italy to 
characterize the effect of the leader’s sticky price commitment on the price interdependence 
within the Italian gasoline market. Second, using the weekly average wholesale prices of eight 
other European countries we test whether the sticky-leadership equilibrium led to a price 
increase. 
In the first part of our analysis we compare the interdependence of the leader’s and competitors’ 
price changes before and after the market leader introduced its new pricing policy. Before the 
policy change, competitors adjusted prices every five days following short run cost changes, but 
after the policy change the time lag between their price changes increased to nine days and the 
price-cost correlation decreased from .89 to .73. Using a logit model with firms’ fixed effect we 
show that the probability of a competitor aligning its price to the leader’s in response to a leader’s 
price change significantly increased after the policy change. In addition, as price alignment is 
defined narrowly (up to the third decimal) we also look at the percentage price difference 
between the leader and its competitors. Results are consistent across specifications and point out 
that competitors coordinated price changes following the leader’s focal price after, but not before 
the new policy. 
In the second part we show that sticky-leadership pricing had a positive and significant effect on 
prices. We use a difference-in-differences approach to compare Italian prices with European 
prices before and after the implementation of the policy. In addition, as researchers often select 
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comparison groups on the basis of subjective measures of similarity between treated and 
untreated units, we employ a synthetic control group estimation as developed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) to demonstrate that the 
choice of selected control groups does not drive our results. The synthetic control group is 
constructed using a data-driven weight of European prices that minimizes the pre-treatment 
differences between the Italian price and the resulting synthetic control group. This lowers the 
discretion of researchers in selecting control groups and forces them to show the relative weight 
of each individual control group.  
Our results are consistent across specifications and show that Italian prices significantly increased 
when compared to a control group after the new sticky-leadership pricing was in place. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we describe the main features of the Italian petrol 
market and in section 3 we present the data. In section 4 we perform the empirical analysis and 
section 5 is a conclusion.  
2 The Italian Petrol Industry 
The Italian wholesale gasoline industry is characterized by many traits which facilitate collusion: a 
small number of vertically integrated firms, high entry costs, inelastic demand, frequent and small 
purchases by different consumers and a transparent cost and price structure.6 There are nine 
firms operating in the market holding 95% of market share, while the rest is held by small 
independent retailers that purchase gasoline from one of the vertically integrated firms. The nine 
big players are ENI,7 Esso, ERG, Shell, Q8, Total, API/IP8, and Tamoil.  
Market shares are asymmetric across firms. In 2004 ENI, the market leader, accounted for about 
35% market share. The second largest player on the market was Esso with a market share of 
16%, followed by Q8 with around 11%. The six other firms account for a market share that 
ranges between 5% and 8%. All firms are vertically integrated, i.e. they either have access to 
crude oil or they hold shares in companies that run refineries in Italy or Europe. Each firm 
operates a retailer network with exclusive contracts binding the retailers to the wholesaler on a 
long-term basis which makes it difficult for other companies to enter the market or to increase 
their market share. The retailers, petrol stations, can either be independent companies or are 
directly owned by the wholesalers. Half of these stations are owned by the oil companies, the 
                                                 
6 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006) for a discussion on the determinants of cartels’ success.  
7 ENI acts on the Italian market under the name of “Agip”, its “Refining and Marketing” division dealing with gasoline.  
8 API and IP merged in 2005, when ENI sold IP to API. 
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other half are owned by small private companies, each of them managing on average 30 to 50 
stations in one city or region.  
Distribution and price setting works as follows: the oil companies communicate to the manager 
of the petrol station the so-called “suggested price”, the price we observe in our data. This price 
is a non-binding indication of the final retail price petrol stations supplied by that company 
should charge to consumers. The final retail price of petrol stations with the same brand might 
vary slightly from region to region due to different fiscal regimes, storage and transportation 
costs. The owners of the petrol station receive a discount on the suggested price depending on 
the incentive contract they have negotiated with their respective wholesaler, and the owners are 
allowed to charge up to a certain percentage on top of the suggested price. Thus, the retail price 
varies between a minimum, the suggested price minus the discount, and a maximum that is fixed 
by the wholesaler, so even though the station managers fix the final retail price, their available 
range falls between their purchase price and the maximum price they are allowed to charge, as 
stipulated by the oil company. Thus, their freedom to set prices is low and the effect of 
managerial choice of petrol station owners does not bias this analysis which focuses on 
competition between the nine large wholesalers and not between the owners of petrol stations. 
The strong similarity between “suggested” and final prices has been confirmed by the Italian 
antitrust authority which stated that “the suggested price constitutes an extremely narrow 
measure in relation to what the consumer will pay for retail gasoline.”9 
With respect to the cost structure, the most important cost for oil companies is the Premium 
Unleaded Gasoline Mediterranean Price, which is reported by the Platts.10 In Italy the reference 
cost for buying gasoline on the refinery markets based in Genoa (north-west Italy) and Lavera 
(southern France) is the Platts Cif Med (Platts). This price index is widely regarded as the major 
(opportunity) cost for wholesalers11 and is used by market-specific newspapers and industry 
insiders to calculate industrial margins, commonly defined as the difference between the 
“suggested price” and the Platts. The “suggested price” has two components: a fiscal one and an 
industrial one. It has been estimated by the Italian Union of Petrol Producers that the Platts 
reflects 67 percent of the industrial price, while the other 33 percent is attributable to 
distribution, storage, administrative steps and the petrol stations' margin. Taxes account for 
                                                 
9 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, 
Section IV, para. 27, available at http://www.agcm.it.  
10 Platts is a division of the Information & Media Services group of McGraw-Hill and a leading global provider of energy 
information that collects and publishes on a daily basis details on the prices of bids and offers for specific oil products and regions 
from traders and exchange platforms. 
11 See for example the analysis of the composition of final retail prices into industrial and fiscal components by the Italian Petrol 
Union, available at http://www.unionepetrolifera.it/it/show/34/La%20struttura%20del%20prezzo or the Pöyry (2009) report on 
EU fuel prices.  
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approximately 58 percent of the final retail price in Italy and are the major component of the 
final price.  
3 Data 
We use two different datasets, the first of which is a dataset which consists of daily firm-specific 
pre-tax wholesale prices and industry level costs as reported by the Platts Cif Med. This data is 
summarized in Table 1 and will be used to analyze the pricing strategies adopted by the leader 
and the reaction of the competitors. The wholesale prices, plotted in Figure I, refer to the 
“suggested prices” of gasoline described above from the nine major companies ENI, Api, Erg, 
Esso, IP, Q8, Shell, Tamoil and Total from 1st January 2003 until 15th May 2005. As discussed 
above, the main source of costs for firms is the Platts, which represents the implicit opportunity 
cost to firms to sell their gasoline on the European wholesale market rather than to their petrol 
stations.  
The second dataset consists of average aggregate retail gasoline prices for EU countries, which 
include taxes. This dataset is taken from the European Commission Oil Bulletin, which reports 
the prices of oil products across Europe on a weekly basis.12 The countries we consider to be the 
EU benchmark are the Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal for the period from January 2003 to May 2005. These prices include taxes and were 
collected weekly. A summary of the EU data per country is reported in Table 2, while a plot of 
the Brent, Italian and EU prices can be seen in Figure II. 
4 Tacit Collusion through Sticky Leadership Pricing 
We analyze the incidents relating to 6th October 2004 (first vertical line in Figure I) when ENI 
publicly announced the adoption of a new pricing policy which consisted of fewer and larger 
price changes. ENI increased its average price change from 1% to 5.8% and increased the time 
lag between price changes from 6 days to 16 days. ENI declared that the purpose of this policy 
was to lower the short-term price-cost relation and to stabilize retail prices.13 About five months 
later in March 2005 (third vertical line in Figure I) the Italian Truckers’ Association, FITA, 
complained to the Italian antitrust authority about high and aligned prices.14 About two years 
later, in January 2007, the Italian antitrust authority started an investigation into price fixing. Due 
                                                 
12 For an in-depth analysis of the European gasoline market we refer to the report commissioned by the EU Commission and 
edited by Pöyry Energy Consulting in 2009. 
13 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, 
Section VI, para. 42, available at http://www.agcm.it. 
14 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, 
Section I, para. 1, available at http://www.agcm.it. 
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to the lack of evidence of direct communication between firms the antitrust authority decided to 
end the investigation in December 2007 without punishing ENI and its competitors for an 
antitrust violation. The authority could only achieve a commitment by the firms to reduce price 
transparency on the market.15  
The aim of the empirical analysis is to describe the different pricing patterns which emerged after 
the leader’s unilateral price commitment and to test whether this change caused a price increase.  
In the first part of the empirical analysis we focus on characterizing the main traits of the pricing 
behavior of firms and on the relation between the leader’s and competitors’ price changes. We 
test whether the standard deviation, competitors’ alignment and the frequency and magnitude of 
price variations significantly changed after the policy and thus, whether competitors adopted the 
same pricing behavior as the leader. In addition we test for the emergence of leadership pricing 
by analyzing competitors’ price reactions to price changes by the leader.  
In the second part we test whether the new price pattern was pro-collusive and caused a price 
increase using a difference-in-differences method and a synthetic control group approach. 
Throughout the empirical analysis we will use the date when ENI’s competitors started to align 
to ENI (12th November 2004) as the beginning of the policy (second vertical line in Figure I) 
and not the date on which ENI announced its new pricing policy (6th October 2004). This choice 
reflects the emergence of the new sticky-leadership pricing after the transition period 
characterized by ENI’s price commitment and does not significantly affect our results.16   
4.1 Policy Change and Competitors’ Alignment 
4.1.1 Sticky-pricing 
Sticky pricing constitutes an important element in a strategy to sustain collusion. An advantage of 
sticky pricing is that it is straightforward to implement and that deviations can easily be detected 
and punished. In a series of theoretical papers Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), Athey et al. 
(2004) analyse dynamic collusive pricing. The key trade-off that emerges from the theoretical 
analysis of firms’ incentives to engage in sticky pricing as collusive strategy is between productive 
efficiency that requires firms with lower costs to produce more and higher (aligned) prices under 
collusion. Under some parameter constellations the optimal equilibrium for firms is relatively 
                                                 
15 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 20.12.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 17754, 
available at http://www.agcm.it. 
16 We ran all the regressions both including and excluding the “commitment” period (interval between the first two vertical lines 
in Figure I). The inclusion of this period neither changes the sign nor the significance level of the estimated coefficients.  
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simple: all firms adopt a sticky pricing scheme and charge the consumers’ reserve price.17 Thus, 
firms sacrifice productive efficiency to sustain a higher price level in the market. The theoretical 
prediction that collusion is linked to sticky pricing is confirmed by a series of empirical findings 
based on ex-post evidence of cartel pricing (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2006, Blanckenburg et al., 2011, 
Connor, 2005). In this section we provide statistical evidence according to which firms adopted 
sticky pricing after the new policy was introduced.  
Table 3 reports the firms’ absolute percentage price changes on days with price changes 
(columns 1 and 2) and the number of days between price changes (columns 4 and 5) before and 
after ENI’s new policy respectively. In column 3 and 6 we report the difference (in italics) of the 
pre and post policy means of frequency and magnitude and the t-statistic (in bold). Before the 
policy firms’ price changes were frequent and price changes were small. On average changes 
occurred every 5 days and the average price change was .8%. After the new pricing policy, price 
changes occurred less frequently, on average every 9 days, and their amount became larger, 
namely 2.9%. Performing the same analysis for each firm individually, we get the same results: all 
competitors significantly increased the magnitude of price changes and six out of eight 
competitors significantly increased the time lag between price changes which shows that 
competitors substantially adopted the leader’s new pricing policy as can be seen in Figure I. 18 
In addition, we test whether the daily dispersion of prices across firms decreased after the policy, 
a common finding in cases of collusion. The right part of Figure III displays the kernel density 
distribution of the daily price standard deviation19 across firms before and after the policy was 
implemented. The dotted line indicates the price dispersion after the policy change and suggests a 
decrease in the dispersion after the policy. In contrast the mean price dispersion increased 
significantly during the period of sticky pricing. This result is explained by the increase in the 
magnitude of price changes, which caused huge spikes in price dispersion on days where ENI 
changed its prices. In fact while the mean price dispersion is significantly higher (.0022 versus 
.0015), the median is lower (.0012 versus .0015). While this might seem to contrast with our 
collusive hypothesis based on the positive relation between sticky-aligned prices and collusion, in 
Table 5 specification 1, we build a regression model which controls for current and lagged price 
changes by the leader. We find that the mean absolute percentage price difference between the 
leader and competitors significantly decreased after the policy, which is in line with collusive 
                                                 
17 As usual in supergames, many different equilibria might emerge. In this paper we focus on the simplest strategy to sustain 
collusion, i.e. sticky-pricing. With other parameter configurations other (more complex) type of equilibria are possible. 
18 Only one competitor, ERG, publicly declared that it would not directly follow ENI’s new pricing strategy, see Autorità Garante 
della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, Section VI, para. 
41.4, available at http://www.agcm.it.     
19 Using the coefficient of variation yields the same results. 
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leadership pricing. This result suggests that economic screens20 based on price mean-variance 
tests might fail to sufficiently take into account variations in the magnitude of price changes caused 
by focal pricing during collusive periods.  
A shortcoming of sticky pricing models is that they do not address how colluding firms react and 
coordinate on exogenous cost and demand changes. In the next section we will demonstrate that 
ENI’s (focal) price was used by its competitors to coordinate price changes. 
4.1.2 Leadership pricing 
Price leadership is “one of the most important institutions facilitating tacitly collusive pricing 
behavior” (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 346). Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) examine a 
differentiated oligopoly and demonstrate that price leadership facilitates collusion under 
asymmetric information and that it increases price rigidity. They conclude that such a pricing 
scheme has many positive attributes: first, it is easy to implement, second, it doesn’t require 
communication, and third, it is very easy to detect deviations. Mouraviev and Rey (2011) study 
the role of price or quantity leadership in circumstances where firms can act either simultaneously 
or sequentially in an infinitely repeated setting for both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In 
line with Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) they highlight that leadership facilitates collusion.  
We test whether ENI’s commitment led to leadership pricing. The left part of Figure III shows 
the histogram of                    , the sum of aligned competitors. While pre-policy 
alignment, which is a count variable, seems to follow a Poisson distribution, the post-policy 
alignment distribution is more skewed to the right and seems to have a larger number of aligned 
firms. As                    is an over-dispersed count variable that takes values from 0 (no 
competitor aligned) to 8 (all competitors aligned), we run a Negative Binomial Regression model 
to test if the number of aligned firms is higher after the policy. Specification 1 in Table 4 shows 
the result. The coefficient on              is positive and highly significant, and computing the 
marginal effect shows that while the average number of perfectly aligned competitors is 1.95, 
after the policy change it increases to 3.2.  
We now turn to dynamic price alignment and run two regression models to test whether the 
dynamic price response of competitors to price changes by the leader changed after the new 
policy. The key challenge when estimating competitors’ responses is the endogeneity of ENI’s 
price changes which might cause reverse causality. Thus, rather than claiming a causal 
interpretation of the regression coefficients we focus on testing a break in the leader-competitor 
pricing behavior. In particular, we are interested in testing whether the infrequent (but large) 
                                                 
20 For a review of screens and their multiple applicability see Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2009). 
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price changes by the leader served as a focal price to coordinate competitors’ price changes. In 
the first model we use a firm fixed effect logit regression to relate the binary decision by a firm to 
perfectly align its price to the leader’s price to current and past price changes by the leader: 
 
                               ∑   
 
                           
∑   
 
                                              (1) 
      
Where          is a binary indicating whether competitor i charges the same price as the leader at 
day t,         is a dummy being 1 after the policy was introduced and               is a 
dummy being 1 if the leader changed its price on day t-k,    are time-invariant firm fixed effects 
and      is the logistic distribution. The estimation coefficients of the logit model and their 
marginal effects are in Table 4, specification 2.1 and 2.2 respectively, while in specification 2.3 
we report the odds ratios. The key parameters of interest are    which capture the competitors’ 
dynamic price response to a price change by the leader after the policy. The average likelihood of 
a competitor aligning its price to the leader after the policy increased significantly by about 10%. 
Most importantly, after the policy, on days where the leader changed its price, the average 
likelihood of a price alignment decreases by 16.1% and then gradually grows until it reaches 16.4 
to 17.9% from the fourth to the sixth lag. The same results can be seen by looking at odds ratios 
in specification 3. This regression analysis confirms the “visual” dynamic price alignment 
presented in Figure I, where all major price changes by competitors where preceded by ENI’s 
price change after the policy. 
Because          is binary and narrowly defined (i.e. up to three decimal places) we also consider 
a continuous measure as the dependent variable, i.e. the absolute percentage price difference with 
respect to the leader (|                              |). To take into account possible 
asymmetries between positive and negative price changes we also run the regression 
distinguishing between positive and negative price changes. A problem with dividing the samples 
is that after the policy ENI changed its price only 10 times, including 6 negative and 4 positive 
price changes. The coefficients of the three OLS regressions using all, only positive, and only 
negative price changes is shown in Table 5, specifications 1, 3, and 5, respectively. The 
regression coefficients of specification 1 for the two time periods, before and after the policy, are 
plotted in Figure IV as a graphical analysis best depicts the average change in the dynamic 
alignment between periods. After the new policy, the average absolute percentage price 
difference to the leader was 4.59% on days where the leader changed its prices and then this 
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difference decreases to 1.94% (1.38%) [.04%] one (two) [three] day(s) after the leader changes its 
prices. Finally, this difference becomes insignificant on the fourth price-change lag. This relation 
is not present before the policy, where the competitors’ absolute percentage price difference to 
the leader is mostly constant. In specification 2 and 3 we use the percentage price difference to 
the leader and consider positive and negative price changes respectively. The coefficients present 
a similar pattern as in specification 1. After the policy, the average difference to the leader after 
positive (negative) price changes is -6.52% (2.69%) indicating that the magnitude of the leader’s 
positive changes is larger than negative changes. Similar to specification 1, the absolute value of 
these differences decreases after a few lags but the coefficients after the 4th lag become 
insignificant only after positive price changes. For negative changes competitors’ prices slightly 
but significantly undercut the leader’s price by -.05%.   
The estimates presented above show that the competitors’ price reactions with respect to the 
leader’s price changes changed significantly after the policy. Confirming the graphical evidence in 
Figure I, competitors changed and aligned their prices within a few days after the leader changed 
its prices, a common pricing scheme referred to as leadership pricing, adopted to coordinate price 
changes and facilitate alignment.    
4.2 The Effect of the New Pricing Policy on the Price Level 
The previous section focused on the coordination mechanism represented by the sticky-
leadership pricing which emerged after the announced new pricing policy and its relation to 
theoretical and empirical literature on how cartels work. We now turn to the pro-collusive effect 
of the new pricing behavior. The aim of this section is to causally evaluate the effect of ENI’s 
sticky-leadership pricing policy on Italian prices.  
The fundamental problem is that we can at most observe one treatment group (Italy) and have 
no information as to what would have happened without the introduction of the policy.21 As 
markets and firms are simultaneously hit by a multiplicity of shocks our main concern is that ENI 
might be responding to shocks which are unobservable to the econometrician. Thus, the change 
in the post-policy price level in Italy might have been as well caused by omitted variables. To 
control for such unobserved shocks we need to relate Italian prices to a control group which 
received no treatment, the standard procedure in the literature on cartel detection.22 In the case of 
the Italian petrol market, given that prices respond to the same cost shocks across national 
                                                 
21 For a discussion on problems and methods of evaluating different kind of policies see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).  
22 The cartel detection literature takes comparable industries to detect “suspicious” pricing patterns or to evaluate the ex-post 
effects of illegal price coordination. For example Christie and Schultz (1994) compare the dealers’ bid-ask spread in the Nasdaq to 
its equivalent in the Dow Jones, while Porter and Zona (1999) compare bidding behavior of colluding firms with non-colluding 
firms.   
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markets, and that the goods are homogeneous and traded in the same currency, we can use the 
gasoline prices of EU Member States as a benchmark. This permits us to causally link ENI’s new 
pricing policy to the industry’s profits. Using panel data from nine EU Member States we 
estimate the effect of ENI’s price policy using a dif-in-dif model. ENI’s policy change in Italy 
induces a deviation from this common trend, and although the treatment country (Italy) and 
control countries (EU) can differ substantially, all the time invariant country level differences23 
are captured by the (EU countries) fixed effects. The key identifying assumption is that “market 
trends” would be the same in each of the selected EU Member States in the absence of a 
treatment (price policy change). This means that we assume that ENI’s policy and the subsequent 
new pricing pattern were not correlated to any unobservable market shock in Italy. This 
assumption is justified by the fact that ENI declared that the reason they were introducing sticky 
pricing was the increased volatility of the major cost factor, the Platts.24 The Platts is not an Italy-
specific cost index and its volatility ultimately depends on the international price of crude oil. 
Thus, exogenous shocks to the Platts are not limited to the Italian petrol market but impact on 
other countries as well.    
A common shortcoming of the dif-in-dif model has been the sensitivity of its results to 
estimation assumptions. In our case one might question a sufficient “similarity” between the 
Italian and the control group gasoline market. The selection of a control group is usually done on 
the basis of subjective measures of similarity between affected and unaffected groups. We address 
this issue using an “optimal” weighted average of the available control units. This estimation 
technique called “synthetic control group” was developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). This inferential method constructs a data-driven 
synthetic control group using weights of European prices in order to minimize the pre-treatment 
differences between the Italian price and that of the synthetic control group. Intuitively, the 
synthetic control group represents a “better” or “more similar” comparison group for Italian 
prices than any single EU price.25 In addition this method illustrates the similarities and the 
relative contribution of each control group in forming a benchmark. Thus, it lowers the 
discretion in selecting a control group and forces the researchers to show the data-driven weights 
of each group. This estimation procedure allows us to construct a data-driven, and therefore, 
more objective control group and to compare the estimates for the effect of the new policy on 
Italian prices across specifications.  
                                                 
23 The Italian gasoline market differs in some respect from other EU countries as summarized by the report of Pöyry (2009). Italy 
has the lowest throughput per site and hypermarkets own considerably more stations in the rest of the EU than in Italy.   
24 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 18.1.2007, Case I681 – Prezzi dei carburanti in rete, Provvedimento no. 16370, 
Section VI para. 42; available at http://www.agcm.it. 
25 Formally, the weights are constructed to minimize the difference between                  and ∑                  
 
   . 
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In the main regression model we estimate a dif-in-dif using panel data with weekly price 
observations from 9 EU countries over a time period of 29 months. The main regression 
equation is: 
 
                                                                                    (2) 
 
The dependent variable,         , refers to the price of country   at week  .            is an 
interaction term between two dummy variables indicating Italy and the new pricing policy 
respectively.         is a time dummy that switches to 1 after the policy change.    are country 
fixed effects and    is a vector of control variables that vary over time but not across countries. 
In the full specification    contains lagged values of the Brent (crude oil), a linear time trend, 
month and year fixed effects. In some specifications we will add only a dummy for the Italian 
price so that          in order to estimate the “Italian mark-up,” while in other specifications 
we will add all other country dummies and leave out Italy. As already pointed out this “country 
mark-up” reflects structural, time-invariant differences across countries, e.g. wages and taxes.    
The key parameter of interest is   , the interaction between the time after the policy change and a 
dummy indicating Italy’s price.    captures the pre and post policy price difference between the 
treated country (Italy) and the control group (EU), controlling for cost changes (Brent) and 
seasonal effects. If sticky and leadership pricing were used as a facilitating device to sustain a 
supra-competitive price level, we would expect    to be positive and significant.  
The firms’ cost structure across countries depends on three cost sources that can be considered 
separately. The main source of costs, crude oil, is the same for all countries and using the 
standard SBIC and AIC criteria, in line with previous literature, we added four weeks lags to 
account for dynamic price adjustment to costs. The second source of costs are time independent 
(unobserved) country-specific costs, such as wages and transport costs, that will be captured by 
the country fixed effect. Finally there are unobserved time varying firm-level cost shocks which 
we assume to be uncorrelated with ENI’s new policy.  
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for the fixed effect model specified by (2) with 
standard errors clustered at country level in parenthesis. Specifications 1 to 3 use EU countries 
fixed effects and thus show the average price difference of each EU country as compared to Italy, 
while specifications 4 to 6 use a dummy for Italy and leave the other EU countries out. All but 
one country, the Netherlands, have a significantly lower price level than Italy. Greece (France) is 
the country with the lowest (largest) price difference to Italy, namely about -4.6€ (-77.9€) per 
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1000 liters. From specifications 4 to 6 it emerges that Italy has a structural price difference of 
about 30€ per 1000 liters with respect to the other eight EU countries.  
The parameter of the key variable of interest,           , is positive and highly significant across 
specifications. The inclusion of current and lagged costs, i.e. the Brent, and month and year fixed 
effects does not affect the estimate of   . The effect of ENI’s policy was to increase prices by 
about 9.8€ per 1000 liters, which corresponds to a 3% price increase when controlling for costs, 
seasonality and a time trend. This is in line with the collusive hypothesis based on theoretical and 
empirical literature discussed above. Sticky and leadership pricing were used as a means to 
coordinate and raise prices. 
We compare these findings with the synthetic control group approach by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010). In Figure V we plot the 
Italian and the synthetic control price (left part) and their difference (right part). The vertical line 
represents the date of ENI’s policy change. The synthetic control (by construction) tracks the 
Italian price well before the policy change. After the policy change the lines seem to diverge more 
and the difference between the Italian price and the synthetic control increased. Table 7 reports 
the estimates of the weights, pre and post treatment average prices and their difference. The 
Netherlands’s price most closely resembles the Italian one, and thus has a weight of 81%, while 
all other countries oscillate between weights of 5.8% (Greece) and 1.4% (Germany). Whereas the 
pre-treatment synthetic price is by construction very close to the Italian price, the post-treatment 
price differences are large. After the policy change, Italian prices rose by 8.88€ per 1000 Liters 
with a standard error of 2.84. This positive price difference is significant at the 5% level with a p-
value of .014 and is in line with the dif-in-dif estimation discussed above. This confirms that our 
findings of a significant and positive price increase are not the result of a subjective choice of 
control groups.  
One concern with the dif-in-dif model is that prices follow an AR(1) process and thus the error 
terms are correlated over time. Performing an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the Italian and 
European prices and the Brent, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 
conventional confidence levels; in contrast the first difference between the aforementioned 
variables is stationary. To account for the error term correlation we estimate a model in which all 
variables are stationary and the dependent variable is defined as the price difference between the 
Italian price and that of the synthetic control group in week  . We regress this stationary 
difference on the current and lagged first differences of the crude oil,          , a time trend,   , 
and our key variable of interest,        . The time series regression model we estimate is: 
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                                       ∑   
 
                                (3) 
 
The synthetic control group discussed above represents an “optimal benchmark” and 
                     can be thought of as the daily price deviation of the Italian price relative to 
its pre-treatment optimal benchmark. The effect of the new price policy controlling for current 
and lagged cost differences will be captured by   . Due to the weekly level of the time series and 
the relatively short time horizon, 29 months with some gaps due to public holidays, we cannot 
add year and month fixed effects in (3) as we have insufficient data, 94 observations, but instead 
maintain the time trend. Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients. Moving from specification 1 
to 3 we first add current and lagged cost differences and finally a time trend. In line with the dif-
in-dif results all the coefficients on         are significant at the 1% level and positive. Once we 
control for current and lagged costs, first differences and a trend the coefficient grows from 8.8 
to 12.5.  
Our regression analysis confirms that after the introduction of the sticky pricing policy Italian 
prices rose with respect to the period before the policy change and controlling for a synthetic 
control group or EU prices, costs and month and year fixed effects. The regression results 
confirm that the new policy had a positive and significant effect on Italy’s gasoline prices. 
Through sticky and leadership pricing firms have coordinated their price changes and 
significantly increased their price levels relative to the EU. 
4.3 Robustness Check: Productive Efficiency vs. High (Rigid) Prices 
At least since the first theoretical models of the kinked demand curve there has been a long-
standing feeling that collusion is associated with price rigidity. Intuitively, “to collude” means 
attributing a higher weight to keeping high prices rather than setting own prices in accordance 
with demand and firm-level costs. This result has been confirmed in different dynamic settings by 
a series of papers (Athey and Bagwell, 2001, 2008, Athey et al., 2004). While none of these papers 
perfectly match the setting of the Italian petrol market, the common prediction of the theoretical 
literature is that the best collusive scheme consists of rigid prices at the expense of productive 
efficiency. Thus, firms price independently of their own cost type and charge the consumers’ 
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reservation price. The key trade-off is between productive efficiency, whereby the firm with the 
lowest costs serves the market more, and high (rigid) prices that do not reflect firm-level costs.26  
Our collusive hypothesis states that firms adopted sticky leadership pricing to increase their 
margins at the expense of productive efficiency. As a robustness check we test whether our 
hypothesis can be rejected using daily Italian firm level prices. We test two predictions of our 
sticky leadership collusive hypothesis: first, margin differences with respect to the price leader, 
ENI, must become insignificant after the policy change and second, margins must increase. The 
intuition behind this test is that firms aim at increasing their margins by colluding. Firms with 
higher (lower) costs must have higher (lower) prices in a non-collusive equilibrium, but have the 
same profit-maximizing (rigid) price under a collusive scheme.27 Thus, at least some of the 
competitors’ fixed effects should be significant if they price independently, but insignificant if 
they follow the leader’s price. In regression model (4)    captures the effect of the policy on 
margins, while the competitors’ fixed effects capture cost differences with respect to the leader. 
Because of the asymmetric market shares this difference should be positive compared to the 
market leader (the low cost firm) in a non-optimal collusive equilibrium and insignificant in an 
optimal collusive sticky pricing equilibrium.28 As we showed that ENI was the price leader we test 
whether firms increased their margins but decreased the average margin difference with respect 
to ENI.29  
                                                                               (4)             
 
   are firm fixed effects,         is a dummy that switches to one after the policy was 
implemented and    is a time trend. The key parameters of interest are    and    (see 
specification 3) that test whether margins were higher and whether the competitors’ margin 
differences changed with respect to the leader after the policy respectively. The results are 
reported in Table 9. The dependent variable,          , is stationary and defined as the daily 
                                                 
26 Interestingly, Marshall et al. (2008) analyse the role of price announcements in the vitamins cartel and found that during the 
cartel phase the likelihood of a price announcement is driven by the length of time between announcements, rather than by cost 
or demand changes. Their evidence provides empirical support for the hypothesis that during a cartel firms don’t price following 
their own costs and thus the price difference across firms should decrease. Slade (1992) analysed dynamic models of tacit 
collusion in Vancouver’s gasoline market and concluded that between price wars prices were very stable and uniform across firms.   
27 Note that this is equivalent to having higher margins as the major source of costs, i.e. the Platts, is the same for all firms. In 
addition note that firms are capacity constrained and consumers face search costs, thus the low cost firm cannot serve the whole 
market even though it charges the lowest price. 
28 Even though we don’t have information on firm level costs, market shares are very asymmetric. ENI has about 35% market 
shares while the second (third) largest firm has 16% (11%), and all other firms range between 5% and 8%.   
29 We obtain similar results if we test margin differences across all firms (results not shown). 
18 
 
difference between firm’s i price and the Platts.30 In the first (second) specification we perform 
the regression for the pre (post) policy period only. In specification 3 we report the results of 
model (4) and thus include both periods, (time invariant) fixed effects and their interaction with 
the policy dummy. Specification 3 tests for a structural break in the margin differences compared 
to the leader after the policy.  
In line with the previous regressions firms’ average margins significantly increased after the new 
policy by about 22€ per 1000 liters.31 More importantly, the estimates seem to confirm that firms 
exchanged productive efficiency to maintain higher prices. As ENI acted as the price leader and 
has the largest market shares we can reasonably assume that it is the low-cost firm and 
accordingly it should have the lowest margins in the market. In fact, competitors’ margins were 
significantly higher than ENI’s margins before the policy (specification 1) with the exception of 
one firm, ERG. This difference changes sign (from positive to negative) and becomes 
insignificant for all firms after the policy implementation (specification 2). This result is 
confirmed in specification 3 where we include both time periods. The difference between the 
leader’s and its competitors’ margins becomes insignificant as firms adopt sticky-leadership 
pricing which lowers productive efficiency but increases the level of margins in the industry, as 
showed by the positive and significant estimate on         in specification 3. These results 
provide further evidence that the nature of ENI’s new pricing policy was pro-collusive. 
5 Conclusion 
How firms set prices and coordinate price changes in order to tacitly collude in oligopolistic 
markets has been a perennial topic both for economics and antitrust policy. This paper examines 
dynamic pricing in the Italian wholesale gasoline market and highlights the importance of 
endogenous sticky price commitment and leadership pricing in tacit collusion.  
We investigate the role of sticky-leadership pricing as a coordination mechanism to bring about 
and sustain (tacit) collusion. After its unilateral sticky-pricing commitment the market leader, 
ENI, did not change its price for 57 days irrespective of cost changes while competitors kept 
cost-based pricing. Sticky and leadership pricing emerged as the new pricing equilibrium and was 
adopted by all firms. Firms coordinated price changes through the leader's (focal) price and this 
coordination resulted in a price increase relative to EU prices. 
                                                 
30 We also ran a similar regression (results not shown) using firms’ prices as the dependent variable and controlling for current 
and lagged costs. The findings are unchanged with respect to model (5).  
31 If we leave out the trend (results not shown) the coefficient on the policy dummy is smaller, 16€ per 1000 liters, but still 
significant at the 1% level. 
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In the first part of the empirical analysis we characterize the main traits of firms’ pricing and the 
leader-competitor pricing interdependence. We show that after the new policy was implemented, 
firms increased the magnitude and the time lag between price changes, and thus adopted the 
same pricing policy as the leader had announced. In addition, we demonstrate that competitors 
adjusted their prices following the leader’s price changes after but not before the implementation 
of the new policy. In the second part of the empirical analysis we focus on the effects of the 
newly emerged sticky-leadership pricing on the level of Italian prices with respect to a control 
group. We use a dif-in-dif and a synthetic control group approach to evaluate whether this sticky 
leadership pricing resulted in higher prices. In all specifications we find that prices significantly 
increased, with estimates ranging from 8 to 12€ per 1000 liters. Combined, this price 
coordination mechanism and the subsequent price increase show that the effect of the unilateral 
price commitment was to tacitly collude through facilitating price coordination. 
These findings cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of cartel enforcement that depends on 
evidence of (explicit) communication. Tacit collusion appears to be a “natural” way in which 
oligopolistic markets work. Firms in oligopolistic markets can use their market power to 
influence competitors’ conduct and collude through specific pricing strategies. How to address 
such unilateral conduct with welfare-decreasing effects without unduly limiting the freedom of 
price setting in oligopolies remains an unanswered question though. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics Italian Prices 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
ENI 0.375 0.0400 0.310 0.476 866 
API 0.378 0.0397 0.313 0.476 866 
ERG 0.376 0.0401 0.312 0.481 866 
ESSO 0.376 0.0398 0.313 0.476 866 
IP 0.377 0.0396 0.313 0.476 866 
Q8 0.377 0.0399 0.312 0.476 866 
SHELL 0.377 0.0402 0.313 0.476 866 
TAMOIL 0.377 0.0399 0.310 0.476 866 
TOTAL 0.378 0.0398 0.313 0.476 866 
Platts Cif. Med. 0.228 0.0391 0.159 0.340 866 
Nr. Aligned Firms 2.206 2.446 0 8 866 
Aver. Price Dif. 0.00250 0.00346 0 0.0404 866 
St. Dev. Prices 0.00174 0.00165 0 0.0205 866 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of “suggested” daily firm level pre-tax prices in the Italian 
gasoline market from January 2003 to May 2005. The units of observation are Euro per liter. 
        
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics EU Prices 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Italy 368.9 39.40 308.1 466.3 119 
Belgium 328.3 39.18 255.6 421.1 119 
Germany 312.6 39.14 254.8 387.5 119 
Spain 338.0 37.54 280.3 410.5 119 
France 288.9 39.11 231.8 383.6 119 
Greece 362.0 39.61 296.2 453.8 119 
Netherlands 371.9 40.29 310 464.5 119 
Portugal 334.0 38.01 280.7 414.5 119 
Austria 348.6 38.52 290.3 431.5 119 
Mean EU Price 335.5 37.46 285.3 414.1 119 
Brent 187.6 34.46 132.3 273.0 119 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of weekly EU Prices from January 2003 to May 2005. The 
units of observation are Euros per 1000 liters. 
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Table 3: Frequency and Magnitude of Price Changes 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Abs. % Price Change Days between price changes 
Time period Pre Post 
 
Pre Post 
 
 
Mean Mean Difference Mean Mean Difference 
 
(St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) t-stat (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) t-stat 
 [Obs.] [Obs.] [Obs.] [Obs.] [Obs.] [Obs.] 
              
All Firms 0.0088 0.0293 0.0205*** 5.3 9.47 4.16*** 
 
(0.0065) (0.0319) 19.27 (5.43) (7.67) 8.81 
 [1143] [172] [1315] [1143] [172] [1315] 
ENI 0.0103 0.0586 0.0483*** 6.63 16.4 9.76*** 
 
(0.0071) (0.0377) 11.45 (7.81) (10.95) 3.64 
 [104] [10] [114] [104] [10] [114] 
API 0.0081 0.0254 0.0173*** 4.94 8 3.05** 
 
(0.006) (0.03) 6.01 (4.69) (6.93) 2.67 
 [135] [23] [158] [135] [23] [158] 
ERG 0.0111 0.028 0.0169*** 6.61 8.8 2.19 
 
(0.007) (0.0311) 4.95 (5.67) (6.17) 1.59 
 [101] [21] [122] [101] [21] [122] 
ESSO 0.0083 0.0268 0.0185*** 5.2 9.25 4.04*** 
 
(0.0061) (0.0299) 6.29 (5.08) (7.3) 3.1 
 [129] [20] [149] [129] [20] [149] 
IP 0.0089 0.0372 0.0283*** 5.6 12.92 7.32*** 
 
(0.0067) (0.034) 8.03 (5.16) (9.88) 4.47 
 [120] [14] [134] [120] [14] [134] 
Q8 0.0118 0.0277 0.0159*** 6.76 9.1 2.34 
 
(0.0067) (0.0332) 4.4 (7.33) (6.4) 1.33 
 [100] [20] [120] [100] [20] [120] 
SHELL 0.0074 0.0333 0.0259*** 4.39 11.25 6.85*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.036) 8.11 (4.14) (9.77) 5.31 
 [153] [16] [169] [153] [16] [169] 
TAMOIL 0.0068 0.0229 0.0161*** 4.12 7.38 3.25*** 
 
(0.0058) (0.0298) 6.27 (4.21) (5.32) 3.45 
 [165] [25] [190] [165] [25] [190] 
TOTAL 0.0088 0.025 0.0162*** 4.9 8 3.09** 
 
(0.0059) (0.0273) 6.18 (4.7) (7.01) 2.69 
 [136] [23] [159] [136] [23] [159] 
Table 3 summarizes two key features of firms’ pricing strategies before and after the leader’s pricing policy 
change. Columns 1 and 2 report the absolute mean price change on days with price changes for all firms 
(first row) and at the firm level. Columns 4 and 5 report the average days between price changes. In 
Columns 3 and 6 we calculate the pre and post policy differences of these two variables and the t-statistic 
testing whether the difference is significantly different. In square brackets we report the number of 
observations. 
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Table 4: Price Leadership (1) 
  (1) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
Dependent Variable Number of aligned 
firms 
Firmj,t 
aligned 
Firmj,t 
aligned 
Firmj,t  
aligned 
Regression Model Negative Binomial 
FE Logit / 
Coef. 
Marg. 
Effects 
FE Logit / Odds 
Ratios 
Policy Change 0.539*** 0.547*** .1008*** 1.728*** 
 
(0.0898) (0.0794) (.016) (.137) 
Policy*Leader changes 
price dummy 
  
 
Lag 0 
 
-1.512*** -.161*** .220*** 
  
(0.393) (.023) (.086) 
Lag 1 
 
-0.0321 -.0054 .968 
  
(0.262) (.043) (.253) 
Lag 2 
 
0.158 .027 1.171 
  
(0.265) (.048) (.31) 
Lag 3 
 
0.560** .109* 1.751** 
  
(0.272) (.059) (.475) 
Lag 4 
 
0.801*** .164*** 2.23*** 
  
(0.265) (.062) (.592) 
Lag 5 
 
0.762*** .155** 2.144*** 
  
(0.265) (.061) (.569) 
Lag 6 
 
0.864*** .179*** 2.375*** 
  
(0.267) (.063) (.634) 
Leader changes price 
dummy 
   
 
Lag 0 
 
-0.432*** -.066*** .648*** 
  
(0.101) (.014) (.065) 
Lag 1 
 
-0.276*** -.044*** .758*** 
  
(0.0959) (.014) (.072) 
Lag 2 
 
-0.117 -.019 .889 
  
(0.0926) (.014) (.082) 
Lag 3 
 
-0.292*** -.046*** .746*** 
  
(0.0945) (.014) (.07) 
Lag 4 
 
-0.337*** -.053*** .713*** 
  
(0.0966) (.014) (.069) 
Lag 5 
 
-0.336*** -.053*** .714*** 
  
(0.0969) (.014) (.069) 
Lag 6 
 
-0.463*** -.071*** .628*** 
  
(0.101) (.014) (.063) 
Ln_alpha -0.238** 
  
 
 
(0.0953) 
  
 
Firms Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.554*** 
  
.325*** 
 
(0.0447) 
  
(.029) 
Observations 866 6,928 6,872 6,872 
R-squared 
   
 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of regression model (1). It tests whether ENI’s competitors changed their pricing behaviour in 
response to the sticky pricing policy. Note that policyt turns to 1 after 12th November, the date on which most competitors started to 
follow ENI’s new policy and not on the date the policy was announced, 6th October. The choice of the beginning of the treatment 
period does not change the results significantly. The first specification uses a negative binomial model to test whether the number of 
competitors perfectly aligned to the leader increased after the policy change. Results are in line with the t-test presented in Section V.3. 
In the second and third column we report the regression coefficients and marginal effects of the fixed-effects logit regression model 
(1). In the last column we perform the same regression using a different variable, the absolute percentage price difference with respect 
to the leader. For a graphical representation of the regression coefficients in column (3) see Figure IV. (Robust) standard errors are 
reported in parentheses for columns (3) 1, 2.1 and 2.2. The stars on the coefficients are defined as follows: * (**) and [***] refer to p-
values below 10% (5%) and [1%]. 
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Table 5: Price Leadership (2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Absolute % Price 
Difference To Leader 
% Price Difference To Leader 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Leader's price changes: Pos & Neg Positive Negative 
              
Policy Change -0.00239*** (0.000290) -0.00464*** (0.000423) 0.00178*** (0.000447) 
Policy*Leader changes 
price dummy 
      
Lag 0 0.0459*** (0.000951) -0.0652*** (0.00167) 0.0269*** (0.00119) 
Lag 1 0.0194*** (0.000950) -0.0309*** (0.00167) 0.00832*** (0.00118) 
Lag 2 0.0138*** (0.000994) -0.0250*** (0.00167) 0.00237* (0.00127) 
Lag 3 0.00409*** (0.000993) -0.00377** (0.00191) 0.00326*** (0.00118) 
Lag 4 -0.00109 (0.000993) -0.00108 (0.00191) -0.00331*** (0.00118) 
Lag 5 -0.00260*** (0.000994) -0.00181 (0.00191) -0.00539*** (0.00119) 
Lag 6 -0.00170* (0.000995) -0.00216 (0.00191) -0.00536*** (0.00118) 
Leader changes price 
dummy       
Lag 0 0.00197*** (0.000298) -0.00361*** (0.000425) 0.00775*** (0.000464) 
Lag 1 0.000650** (0.000296) -0.00120*** (0.000424) 0.00342*** (0.000457) 
Lag 2 4.87e-05 (0.000295) -0.000518 (0.000424) 0.00287*** (0.000459) 
Lag 3 0.000121 (0.000294) 0.000435 (0.000421) 0.00204*** (0.000459) 
Lag 4 0.000216 (0.000295) 0.000147 (0.000421) 0.00169*** (0.000465) 
Lag 5 0.000398 (0.000296) 0.000879** (0.000421) 0.00181*** (0.000463) 
Lag 6 0.000534* (0.000298) 0.00123*** (0.000430) 0.00171*** (0.000452) 
Firms Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.00573*** (0.000157) 0.00504*** (0.000247) 0.00362*** (0.000221) 
Observations 6,872 
 
3,960 
 
2,872 
 
R-squared 0.338 
 
0.440 
 
0.376 
 Table 5 reports the estimation results of regression model (1) using a different dependent variable and OLS. It is an additional test 
to the results reported in Table 4 of whether ENI’s competitors changed their pricing behaviour in response to the sticky pricing 
policy. The dependent variable in specification 1 is the absolute percentage price difference of competitor j with respect to the 
leader in day t. In specifications 3 and 5 we consider only positive and negative price changes by the leader respectively. The 
dependent variable in these specifications is the percentage price difference with respect to the leader. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses, the stars on the coefficients are defined as follows: * (**) and [***] refer to p-values below 10% (5%) and [1%]. 
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Table 6: Dif-in-Dif Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Price of country i ant time t 
Model: FE FE FE FE FE FE 
              
IT*Pol_Change 9.877*** 9.863*** 9.863*** 9.877*** 9.863*** 9.863*** 
 
(1.970) (2.110) (2.126) (1.964) (2.101) (2.117) 
Italy 
   
30.75** 30.39** 30.39** 
    
(9.292) (9.311) (9.381) 
Policy Change 0.245 -31.35*** -18.53*** 0.245 -31.35*** -18.53*** 
 
(3.196) (3.634) (2.778) (3.185) (3.619) (2.767) 
Time Trend 0.706*** 0.152*** 0.475 0.706*** 0.152*** 0.475* 
 
(0.0340) (0.0396) (0.284) (0.0339) (0.0394) (0.283) 
Belgium -37.98*** -37.84*** -37.84*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Germany -53.68*** -52.78*** -52.78*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Spain -28.29*** -27.78*** -27.78*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   France -77.39*** -77.90*** -77.90*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Greece -4.272*** -4.656*** -4.656*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Netherlande 5.597*** 4.751*** 4.751*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Portugal -32.33*** -29.94*** -29.94*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Austria -17.69*** -17.01*** -17.01*** 
   
 
(0.513) (0.490) (0.494) 
   Brent (Lag 0-4)  
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Month Fixed Effects 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Constant 322.3*** 139.2*** 130.7*** 291.6*** 108.8*** 100.3*** 
 
(1.568) (5.832) (5.304) (7.925) (11.51) (12.49) 
       Observations 1,071 891 891 1,071 891 891 
R-squared 0.612 0.880 0.925 0.35 0.62 0.66 
Number of Groups 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the dif-in-dif regression model in (2). It tests whether Italian prices increased 
after the introduction of the sticky pricing policy compared to a benchmark, EU countries. Specification 1 to 3 reports 
the coefficients on the benchmark countries while specification 4 to 6 reports Italy’s fixed effect. In the first three 
specifications the coefficients represent the country specific price difference compared to Italy, while the last three 
specifications show Italy’s price level compared to the benchmark. Specification 1 to 3 is symmetric to specification 4 to 
6, respectively. In all specifications Italy’s price significantly increases after the policy was introduced. Standard errors 
clustered at country level are in parentheses while the stars on the coefficients are defined as follows: * (**) and [***] 
refer to p-values below 10% (5%) and [1%]. 
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Table 7: Synthetic Control Method 
State weight to compute 
"synthetic control group" 
Mean Italian 
price 
Mean synthetic 
control 
Difference t-statistic p-value Obs.  
Belgium 0.021 Entire Sample 
    Germany 0.014 368.85 366.51 2.33* 1.8 0.073 119 
Spain 0.027 Pre Sticky Pricing 
   
 
France 0.004 354.85 354.82 0.02 0.02 0.981 88 
Greece 0.058 Sticky Pricing 
   
 
Netherlands 0.814 408.60 399.72 8.88** 2.6 0.014 31 
Portugal  0.024 
 Austria 0.038 
The left part of Table 7 shows the weights that have been used to construct the synthetic control group. These weights are 
estimated by minimizing the difference between the pre-treatment (price policy change) Italian price and the other EU countries. 
The EU price which most closely resembles the Italian one is the Dutch price with a weight of .814. In the right part of the table we 
compare the Italian and synthetic control price in three different time periods: entire sample, pre and post treatment. By 
construction the weights are chosen to maximize the similarity of the Italian and synthetic price before the treatment, and thus their 
difference is small and insignificant. This guarantees that the synthetic control group more closely resembles Italian price 
movements before the policy and allows us to estimate the causal effect of ENI’s new pricing policy on prices. “Difference” shows 
the difference between Italian and synthetic price, while t-statistic and p-value report the estimates of the test: H0: IT_Price-
Synth=0. The estimated price difference in the sticky pricing period is 8.88€ per 1000 liters which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
 
 
Table 8: Synthetic Control Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable IT-Synthetic Control price at time t 
Model OLS OLS  OLS 
       
Policy Change 8.856*** 9.746*** 12.551*** 
 
(3.59) (3.059) (4.224) 
Time Trend  
 
-.048 
 
 
 
(.0369) 
Brent (Lag Dif 0-4)  Yes Yes 
Constant .028 .561 2.918* 
 (1.197) (1.064) (1.752) 
    
Observations 119 94 94 
R-squared .076 .479 .486 
In Table 8 we run an OLS regression of the policy change dummy, policyt, on the price 
difference between Italy and the Synthetic Control, ΔPriceIT-Synth,t. In specifications 2 and 3 
we add the lagged first differences of the Brent. Results are consistent with the dif-in-dif 
model and show a significant positive change in the Italian price difference with respect to 
the synthetic control after the policy. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * (**) and 
[***] refer to p-values below 10% (5%) and [1%].  
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Table 9: Robustness check 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 Dependent Variable Margin of firm i at time t 
 
Coef. St. Err Coef. St. Err Coef. St. Err 
Time period Pre Sticky Pricing Sticky Pricing All 
              
Policy Change     22.95*** (2.036) 
API 2.692*** (0.836) -2.070 (2.844) 2.692*** (0.836) 
ERG 1.372 (0.838) -1.674 (2.847) 1.372 (0.839) 
ESSO 1.460* (0.848) -1.281 (2.887) 1.460* (0.848) 
IP 1.840** (0.854) -0.635 (2.891) 1.840** (0.854) 
Q8 2.273*** (0.831) -0.938 (2.905) 2.273*** (0.832) 
SHELL 1.633* (0.858) -1.682 (2.880) 1.633* (0.858) 
TAMOIL 1.843** (0.849) -2.437 (2.829) 1.843** (0.850) 
TOTAL 2.692*** (0.843) -1.270 (2.848) 2.692*** (0.843) 
Policy*API 
  
  -2.070 (2.827) 
Policy*ERG 
  
  -1.674 (2.831) 
Policy*ESSO 
  
  -1.281 (2.870) 
Policy*IP 
  
  -0.635 (2.872) 
Policy*Q8 
  
  -0.938 (2.887) 
Policy*SHELL 
  
  -1.682 (2.864) 
Policy*TAMOIL 
  
  -2.437 (2.814) 
Policy*TOTAL 
  
  -1.270 (2.830) 
Time Trend  -0.0144*** (0.00103) -0.0896*** (0.0115) -0.0159*** (0.00104) 
Constant 374.6*** (16.51) 1,637*** (190.2) 398.3*** (16.68) 
       Observations 6,129 
 
1,665 
 
7,794 
 R-squared 0.034   0.033   0.115   
Table 9 reports the estimates of regression model (5). The dependent variable, margin, is expressed in Euro per 1000 
liters. In specification 1 (2) we include only firm fixed effect for the pre (post) policy period. In specification (3) we 
include both the pre and post sticky pricing time period, firm fixed effects and their interaction with the policy dummy. 
The results show that while competitors’ margins were significantly higher than ENI’s margins before the policy, after 
the policy this difference becomes insignificant. In addition, the estimate on the policy dummy which captures the post 
policy difference in average industry margins is positive and significant. This shows that controlling for firms’ fixed 
effects the policy had a positive impact on the profitability of the Italian gasoline industry. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses while the stars on the coefficients are defined as follows: * (**) and [***] refer to p-values below 10% (5%) 
and [1%]. 
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